who is a Senior Associate at Vinod Kothari & Company. She can be contacted
at [email protected]]
164(2) of the Companies Act, 2013 (the “Act, 2013”), then such director shall
not be eligible to be re-appointed as a director of that company or be
appointed in other company for a further period of 5 years from the date on
which the company commits certain failures. Thus, disqualification under
section 164(2) does not envisage immediate vacation of office. Of course,
disqualification is immediate but the director is allowed to serve the present
tenure in that company and in other companies in which such person is a
director. The intent behind this is of course to not render the company ‘board-less’.
A company can possibly not function without a board and it is keeping this in
mind that section 164(2) provides a carve-out to the boards of companies which
have defaulted under this section. Further, one may note that a similar
provision existed under section 274(1)(g) of Companies Act, 1956 (the “Act,
1956”). However, neither was that section applicable to private companies nor did
it attract the provisions of section 283 of the Act, 1956 which pertained to
impression that disqualification under section 164 leads to automatic vacation.
This may seem logical if one were to be disqualified under section 164(1) i.e.
become an undischarged insolvent or is declared as being of unsound mind by a
Court. Most certainly such a person cannot continue as a director. However,
section 164(2) is on a different footing than section 164(1).
debentures may be due to circumstances beyond the control of the company. It is
under such circumstances that the board of the defaulting company will have to
take steps to make good the failure. If the company was rendered board-less,
then in the absence of the decision making authority, it is incomprehensible as
to how will the company make good the default.
possibility of a board-less company by providing that the directors will be
appointed by the promoters or in their absence, by the Central Government. Such
a provision did not exist under Act, 1956. With increased liabilities under
Act, 2013, companies are currently finding
it difficult to appoint directors on the board. Add to that the restriction on the number of
directorships, which has made it difficult for companies to scout for probable
directors. Clearly, in its zeal to mitigate the possibility of a ‘board-less’
company, the law-makers have not apprehended the difficulty in finding a suitable
provisions of section 164(2) and section 167 of Act, 2013. The intent of law
cannot be to incorporate such a provision which will render some other
provision completely otiose. If one were to conclude that sections 164(2) and
167 were to be read together, then section 164(2) will be rendered completely redundant.
Thus, section 164(2) does not lead to ipso
facto vacation. It envisages vacation only at the end of the present tenure
which is logical also. To conclude, a plain reading of sections 164 and
167(1)(a) may give an impression that both are linked. However, given the
intent behind section 164(2), it can be taken that section 167 pertains to
vacation in case of disqualifications under section 164(1) only.
disqualification to section 164(2)(b) of Act, 2013 also apply to directors newly appointed in the company?
of section 164(2)(b), which read as follows:
company which XXX”
section 164(2)(b), it is important that the individual has to be on the board
of the company when the default actually happened. However, what if the company
appoints a director after incurring the default envisaged under section 164?
Will the provisions of section 164(2) also apply to such a director?
provisions of Rule 3(b) of Companies (Disqualification of Directors under
section 274(1)(g) of the Companies Act, 1956) Rules, 2003 which read as
irrespective of the enactment, rules or regulations under which the deposits
have been accepted by the companies, or interest thereon, or redeem its
debentures, or pay any dividend declared on the respective due dates, and if
such failure continues for one year, as described in sub-clause (B) of clause
(g) of sub-section (1) of section 274, then the directors of that company shall
stand disqualified immediately on expiry of that one year from the respective
directors in the relevant year, from the due date to the expiry of one year
after the due date, will be disqualified:
provisions of section 274(1)(g) are applicable to only such directors who were
directors – (i) during the relevant year (ii) from the due date to the expiry
of one year after the due date. Any director appointed any time after these
timelines will not be liable under the provisions of section 274(1)(g). The
reasoning behind the same is also logical in the sense that the section acts as
a deterrent to existing directors from incurring any disqualification under the
section. Admittedly, a new director, during whose directorship the default did
not occur, cannot be held responsible for the same and suffer the misdeeds of
his predecessors. If that was to be the reading of section 274(1)(g) read with
allied Rules, then the proviso to section 274(1)(g)(B) would have been rendered
meaningless. The intent of the proviso is to ensure that the director who has
incurred disqualification under section 274(1)(g) will be disqualified for a
period of 5 years from being appointed but not beyond that. Thus, where the
defaulting director is freed of disqualification after a period of 5 years,
then it is not logical to conclude that a new director, who is the victim of
such misdeeds, will incur any disqualification under section 274(1)(g).
with the allied Rules to mean that even new directors will attract the
disqualification, then possibly no director will be willing to get appointed in
such a defaulting company. This, however, cannot be the intent of law. The law
cannot de-motivate directors from taking up new directorships. On the contrary
the intent of law ought to be to deter companies from defaulting. Even if companies end up defaulting, then
adequate opportunity should be given to the company and its directors to make
good the default.
Rules, 2003. This will however, not change the premise of section 164(2)(b).
Even if an express provision has been dropped altogether, the intent of law
cannot be taken to have changed. Hence, section 164(2)(b) needs to be
interpreted on similar lines as section 274(1)(g) of Act, 2013. To conclude,
any director inducted after the company has defaulted as envisaged under
section 164, will not be disqualified for the purpose of this section.