[In an earlier post, I had offered some initial overview and commentary on the SAT Order in the DLF IPO Case. In the following post, Vinod Kothari offers another perspective that focus on certain specific aspects of the order and analyzes their impact on SEBI’s role as an enforcer of securities regulation. The author can be contacted at [email protected].] The order of the Securities...
SAT Order in the DLF IPO Case
As readers may recall, the adequacy of disclosures in the IPO prospectus pertaining to DLF Limited was called into question in a series of investigations by the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI). The process culminated in SEBI passing an order on October 10, 2014 finding that the disclosures were inadequate and thereby restraining DLF, its directors and CFO from buying or selling...
Regulating Equity Crowdfunding in India
[The following guest post is contributed by Arjya Majumdar, who is an Assistant Professor at the Jindal Global Law School. He can be contacted at [email protected]] In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, small businesses found it increasingly difficult to raise funds. As a response, crowdfunding has emerged as a viable alternative for sourcing capital to support innovative...
Insider Trading and the Risks of Due Diligence Access
[The following post is contributed by Aparna Ravi, a researcher at the Centre for Law and Policy Research, Bangalore and previously a capital markets lawyer in London. She can be contacted at [email protected] She presents an interesting critique of the new SEBI insider trading regulations on matters relating to due diligence set in the backdrop of international experience] In...
Wilful Defaulters: A Further Analysis
[The following post is contributed by Prachi Narayan of Vinod Kothari & Company. She can be contacted at [email protected]. A previous post on the topic discusses SEBI’s recent proposal towards “wilful defaulters”. This guest post discusses in detail the current regime imposed by the RBI and also comments briefly on the SEBI proposal as well as relevant case law on the topic] The...
SEBI’s New Insider Trading Regulations Notified
Changes to the insider trading regime in India have been in the offing for quite some time now, and were the subject-matter of a report under the chairmanship of Justice N.K. Sodhi. Yesterday, SEBI notified the SEBI (Prohibition of Insider Trading Regulations), 2015 that take into account the committee’s recommendations as well as the subsequent public consultation. We will have the opportunity...
SEBI’s Proposal on “Wilful Defaulters”
Over the years, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) has significantly tightened the regime relating to “wilful defaulters” who are declared as such through a process stipulated by the RBI. Upon such a declaration, the regulatory regime of the RBI effectively stifles the ability of a wilful defaulter from raising further bank financing. However, realisation seems to have dawned more lately on the fact...
SEBI Discussion Paper on “Revising the Capital Raising Process”
There is a concern that issuers have resorted to private placements and qualified institutional placements (QIPs) to raise capital from specified investors rather than to public offerings of shares. This is due to the excessive burden and costs associated with a public offering of shares. Being cognizant of this tendency, SEBI has proposed measures to nudge issuers to move away from private...
Year-End Reforms from SEBI
We wish our readers a very happy 2015! The end of 2014 was marked by a flurry of announcements from SEBI, some of which are briefly discussed in this post. Re-Classification of Promoters as Public The concept of “promoters” is quite significant in the Indian context as it is relevant for various purposes. While the existing SEBI regulations define a “promoter”, the circumstances are not entirely...
New Delisting Regulations – tougher rather than easier
New regulations on delisting have been approved by SEBI. I wrote a column on December 1, 2014 (print edition) of the Business Standard, on how a new element of requiring at least 25% of the public shareholders as of a certain date to have participated in selling their shares, would nudge toward counter-productive outcomes. I have pasted the copy below. Earlier, Umakanth had commented...
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