Issues of board independence, and particularly the position and role of independent directors, have resurfaced to the fore in India in recent months. Given this scenario, it may be useful to consider developments relating to board independence occurring elsewhere. Here, a ruling last month from the Delaware Supreme Court on the determination of board independence would be of interest. In Thomas...
SEBI Elaborates on Board Evaluation
Along with the considerable enhancement in the duties and responsibilities of boards of directors of Indian companies that was occasioned due to the Companies Act, 2013 and the SEBI (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2015, there has been a considerable emphasis on board evaluation as a measure of not only enhancing corporate governance in general, but also as a means...
Competition Appellate Tribunal Ruling in the Auto Parts Case
[The following guest post is contributed by Harsh Loonker, who is a final year student at the Jindal Global Law School] The Competition Appellate Tribunal (“Compat”), by way of its order dated December 9, 2016, upheld the order by the Competition Commission of India (“CCI” or the “Commission”) dated August 25, 2014, with minor modifications to the order and a substantial reduction in the...
NCLT Denies Itself the Power to Dispense With Meetings in an Amalgamation
Hitherto, schemes of arrangement were carried out under sections 391 to 394 of the Companies Act, 1956 and the jurisdiction for sanction of the schemes was exercised by the relevant High Court. At the initial stage, the role of the High Court was to call for the meetings of various classes of shareholders and creditors to seek their approval to the scheme. It had been common practice for High...
SEBI Enhances Oversight on Schemes of Arrangement
Since 2013, the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) has exercised oversight in respect of schemes of arrangement proposed by listed companies, including schemes such as amalgamation, demerger, reduction of capital and the like (see here and here). Such oversight has now been enshrined in regulations 11, 37 and 94 of the SEBI (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations...
NALSAR Student Law Review Vol. XII: Call for Papers
[The following announcement is posted on behalf of the NALSAR Student Law Review] The NALSAR Student Law Review (NSLR) is now accepting submissions for its upcoming Volume XII. NSLR is an annual, student-edited, peer-reviewed law review that is the flagship publication of NALSAR University of Law, Hyderabad, India. Submissions may be in the form of Articles (5000-8000...
Measuring outputs v. outcomes: Did the restriction on foreign investment in local debt achieve the intended outcome?
[The following guest post is contributed by Anurag Dutt, Arpita Pattanaik and Bhargavi Zaveri, who are researchers at the Finance Research Group at the Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai.] A good policymaking process requires significant regulatory capacity. Before the policy is enacted, the State must (a) identify a market failure and an appropriate intervention to address...
Et tu Tata!
[The following guest post is contributed by Professor Bala N. Balasubramanian, who is an Adjunct Professor at the Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad] Recent developments at the Tata Group in general and Tata Sons particularly have shaken corporate India in terms of standards of good governance in companies. The group had meticulously built a reputation over the years for ethical and...
Appointment and Removal of Independent Directors: Need for Reform?
The removal this week by three Tata group companies of Mr. Nusli Wadia as an independent director from each of them has reinvigorated some of the debate surrounding board independence from a conceptual standpoint. This has provided critics of board independence with more fodder. In the past, there was anecdotal evidence that whenever there were disagreements between managements or promoters on...
ESOP Shares and the Computation of Open Offer Triggers
Under the SEBI (Substantial Acquisition of Shares and Takeovers) Regulations, 2011 (“Takeover Regulations”), an acquirer must make a mandatory open offer to acquire the shares of the remaining shareholders when the acquirer acquires shares (with voting rights) beyond prescribed thresholds. Since the triggers are based on the acquisition of shares with voting rights, questions could arise whether...
Recent Comments