[Nishika Mittal is a 3rd year BA.LL.B. student at Hidayatullah National Law University, Raipur]
In a significant move, the Securities and Exchange Board of India (“SEBI”) amended the SEBI (Buy-back of Securities) Regulations, 2018, introducing regulation 24(i)(ea) (“the Amendment”). The regulation provides for the freezing of promoter and promoter group shareholdings, including those of their associates, at the International Securities Identification Number (“ISIN”) level during a buy-back. However, it permits tendering of securities under the tender offer route and invocation of encumbrances created before the commencement of the buy-back period. The framework was operationalised through SEBI’s Circular (“the Circular”) dated July 21, 2026, which requires depositories to put in place the necessary systems and operational guidelines.
While the Amendment seeks to regulate dealings in promoter holdings during a buy-back, it raises concerns for lenders engaged in loan-against-securities (“LAS”) arrangements, particularly where promoter shareholdings form part of the collateral under a pledge arrangement. Although the Circular permits invocation of such pre-existing pledges, it also provides that the freeze shall continue to apply to the invoked shares. This raises questions about the extent to which lenders can enforce their security interests and realise the value of pledged shares during the buy-back period.
This post examines the implications of the ISIN-level freeze for lenders holding pledged promoter shares. It first considers the effect of the freeze on the invocation and realisation of pledged shares, and then examines the broader implications for secured lending and the enforcement of security interests.
Regulation 24(i)(ea) and the Operational Circular
The freeze under regulation 24(i)(ea) begins on the date on which the board or shareholders approve the buy-back and it continues until the offer closes. A buy-back, as defined under section 68 of the Companies Act, 2013 (“the Act”), is a company’s purchase of its own shares or other specified securities. The listed company issues instructions to the depositories in a prescribed format, and the depositories mark the freeze on the ISIN. The Circular carves out two exceptions to the freeze: tendering of securities under the tender offer route and invocation of encumbrances created prior to the commencement of the buy-back period, while providing that the freeze shall continue to apply to the invoked shares. SEBI’s consultation paper on “Review and Rationalization of (Buy-Back of Securities) Regulations, 2018” described the freeze as an additional safeguard, aimed at preventing promoters from dealing while the company is itself purchasing its shares.
The restriction applies to promoters and their holdings. Section 2(69) of the Act defines a promoter as a person named in the prospectus or annual return, or one who has control over the company’s affairs, or in accordance with whose advice the board is accustomed to act. The SEBI (Issue of Capital and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2018also recognise a “promoter group”, which includes relatives and connected entities. Under the Circular, “promoter holdings” means the securities held by the promoter and promoter group, including their associates.
Restrictions on Promoter Dealings Prior to the Amendment
The freeze is not the first restriction on promoter dealings in a buy-back. Regulation 24(i)(e) already prohibited promoters and their associates from dealing in the company’s securities from the date of the resolution until the offer closed. This was a prohibition on conduct, and a breach could ordinarily be established only after the transaction had taken place.
Freezes of promoter holdings had earlier been used by SEBI in a different setting. Under regulation 98 of the SEBI (Listing Obligations and Disclosure Requirements) Regulations, 2015, stock exchanges could freeze the holdings of promoters of a non-compliant listed entity. These freezes followed a default and were triggered by the exchange.
Implications of the Amendment
The Amendment introduces a fundamental shift in the nature of the restriction. The freeze is triggered by a corporate decision. It takes effect upon approval of the buy-back and is implemented through instructions issued by the listed company to the depositories. The commencement of the freeze is thus tied to a decision of the board or shareholders, a decision that the promoter may be able to influence.
While regulation 24(i)(e) regulated the conduct of promoters, regulation 24(i)(ea) operates at the depository level, placing a freeze on promoter holdings at the ISIN-level irrespective of who seeks to transact in them. Although lenders may invoke pre-existing encumbrances, the continued freeze on invoked shares raises questions regarding the lenders’ ability to proceed with their sale. The Amendment thus separates the act of invoking a pledge from the ability to realise its value. This framework therefore raises two principal concerns.
Invocation Without Realisation: An Incomplete Remedy
At the outset, permitting invocation without enabling realisation offers the lender only incomplete relief. In its response to public comments, SEBI clarified that invocation of pledge may be allowed subject to freeze continuing in the hands of transferee. This clarifies that the transferee/lender cannot sell the shares to realise the loan.
The purpose of a pledge is to enable the pledgee to sell the shares in the event of default and realise their value. Section 176 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 entitles a pledgee, on default and after reasonable notice, to sell the goods pledged. The Supreme Court in PTC India Financial Services Ltd. v. Venkateswarlu Kari observed that registration of a pledgee as beneficial owner under section 10 of the Depositories Act, 1996 is a procedural step toward a sale and does not itself transfer title. The pledgor retains the right of redemption until sale. Thus, invocation alone does not complete enforcement or enable the lender to recover the debt through the pledged shares.
The Price of Regulatory Restraint: Market Risk and Lender Exposure
Moreover, the freeze affects lenders’ ability to manage the market risk inherent in share-based lending. Fluctuations in the value of pledged shares may require lenders to seek additional collateral or, following a default, invoke the pledge and sell the shares to recover the outstanding amount. However, the new framework prevents the lender from selling the shares and realising their value.
This concern is recognised in K.L. Enterprises LLP v. Bajaj Finance Ltd., where the Delhi High Court observed that pledged shares are inherently volatile and that their prices may fluctuate within minutes. The Court noted that a restraint on sale, without securing the lender’s interest, could expose the lender to a drastic fall in share prices before the award is rendered. It further observed that the commercial determination of when to sell pledged shares lies within the domain of the pledgee, who is not required to consult the borrower as to the time and manner of sale.
The continued freeze may therefore leave lenders exposed to market fluctuations without the ability to mitigate that exposure through sale. This is particularly consequential in margin-funding arrangements, where timely realisation is central to managing the risk associated with pledged shares.
The lender may respond by lowering loan-to-value ratios, widening haircuts or imposing buy-back covenants. These measures, however, increase the cost of promoter borrowing, despite the restriction being expressly temporary. The freeze thus impairs the economic value of the pledge precisely when the lender may need to rely on it. Moreover, the framework does not provide a route by which a lender with a pre-existing security interest may seek limited relief, for instance, a sale to cover a margin shortfall that would not undermine the purposes of the freeze.
Conclusion and Way Forward
The Circular introduces an additional safeguard to regulate promoter dealings during a buy-back. Its effectiveness, however, depends on striking a balance between preventing transactions that undermine the buy-back process and giving effect to the exceptions the regulation itself recognises, namely tendering and the invocation of pre-existing encumbrances, without unduly prejudicing the legitimate interests of lenders holding pledged shares.
Regulation 24(i)(ea) empowers SEBI to specify conditions for transfers on invocation. In exercise of this power, SEBI should permit a lender holding a pre-existing pledge to sell invoked shares on the stock exchange, subject to prior notice to the company and the depository and appropriate disclosure. This would preserve the pledgee’s right of sale while leaving the freeze otherwise applicable to promoter holdings intact. Such a mechanism would seek to protect the integrity of the buy-back process without unduly restricting lenders’ ability to enforce their security interests.
– Nishika Mittal
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