Normal
0
false
false
false
EN-US
JA
X-NONE
/* Style Definitions */
table.MsoNormalTable
{mso-style-name:”Table Normal”;
mso-tstyle-rowband-size:0;
mso-tstyle-colband-size:0;
mso-style-noshow:yes;
mso-style-priority:99;
mso-style-parent:””;
mso-padding-alt:0in 5.4pt 0in 5.4pt;
mso-para-margin:0in;
mso-para-margin-bottom:.0001pt;
mso-pagination:widow-orphan;
font-size:12.0pt;
font-family:”Times New Roman”;}
The Tata-Mistry episode has
brought into focus the minimum shareholding threshold required for a minority
shareholder to bring an action for oppression and mismanagement under sections
241 to 244 of the Companies Act, 2013. In a piece in Bloomberg Quint titled Minority
Shareholder Protection as a Numbers Game, I examine the implications of
such shareholding thresholds that operate as a filter, which seeks to weed out
frivolous and vexatious suits from the genuine ones. However, as I argue in the
piece, such a quantitative threshold raises a number of issues and is minority
shareholder unfriendly, thereby requiring a review of the policy surrounding
such an approach.
brought into focus the minimum shareholding threshold required for a minority
shareholder to bring an action for oppression and mismanagement under sections
241 to 244 of the Companies Act, 2013. In a piece in Bloomberg Quint titled Minority
Shareholder Protection as a Numbers Game, I examine the implications of
such shareholding thresholds that operate as a filter, which seeks to weed out
frivolous and vexatious suits from the genuine ones. However, as I argue in the
piece, such a quantitative threshold raises a number of issues and is minority
shareholder unfriendly, thereby requiring a review of the policy surrounding
such an approach.
Leave a comment