Whether SEBI at all had power to settle disputes by Consent Orders has
been questioned earlier before Delhi Court and it appears that the matter is
still pending. Seemingly to pre-empt this issue, an Ordinance had been passed
amending the SEBI Act and related statutes, which Ordinance has been re-issued
several times. This issue has been discussed several times earlier in this
blog, with this
post on the latest development. That post also gives links of earlier posts
on the issue.
been questioned earlier before Delhi Court and it appears that the matter is
still pending. Seemingly to pre-empt this issue, an Ordinance had been passed
amending the SEBI Act and related statutes, which Ordinance has been re-issued
several times. This issue has been discussed several times earlier in this
blog, with this
post on the latest development. That post also gives links of earlier posts
on the issue.
The Securities Appellate Tribunal (“SAT”) has now considered
an issue arising out of the amendments made by that Ordinance, and Regulations
issued pursuant thereto. The essential question is whether an appeal can lie against
an order of SEBI rejecting an application for Consent Order. SAT has held that,
under the amended law, such applicant has absolutely no right of appeal.
an issue arising out of the amendments made by that Ordinance, and Regulations
issued pursuant thereto. The essential question is whether an appeal can lie against
an order of SEBI rejecting an application for Consent Order. SAT has held that,
under the amended law, such applicant has absolutely no right of appeal.
The distinction between the earlier law and the law amended by the
Ordinance as explained by SAT is worth emphasizing. The earlier section 15T(2) of SEBI Act barred appeal against an order made “with the consent of the parties”. This
would have left orders rejecting application for consent appealable. The
Ordinance omitted Section 15T(2) with effect from 20th April 2007
and inserted Section 15JB retrospectively from same date. Section 15JB barred
appeal “against any order” under that section dealing with application for
consent orders. The SAT thus held that, in view of such retrospective
amendment, the SEBI’s order rejecting the consent application was not appealable.
Ordinance as explained by SAT is worth emphasizing. The earlier section 15T(2) of SEBI Act barred appeal against an order made “with the consent of the parties”. This
would have left orders rejecting application for consent appealable. The
Ordinance omitted Section 15T(2) with effect from 20th April 2007
and inserted Section 15JB retrospectively from same date. Section 15JB barred
appeal “against any order” under that section dealing with application for
consent orders. The SAT thus held that, in view of such retrospective
amendment, the SEBI’s order rejecting the consent application was not appealable.
However, the SAT made several adverse observations while giving the
ruling. The following few important ones are worth noting.
ruling. The following few important ones are worth noting.
a)
It said that SEBI was wrong in delaying
matter for years not giving documents required by the applicant on various
grounds. And then providing the documents to the applicant.
It said that SEBI was wrong in delaying
matter for years not giving documents required by the applicant on various
grounds. And then providing the documents to the applicant.
b)
It also said that SEBI was wrong in denying
adequate opportunity to the applicant to present its case. SEBI gave, after a
long delay, voluminous documents desired by the applicant. However, without
giving time to examine such documents as desired by applicant, it passed an
ex-parte order rejecting the application.
It also said that SEBI was wrong in denying
adequate opportunity to the applicant to present its case. SEBI gave, after a
long delay, voluminous documents desired by the applicant. However, without
giving time to examine such documents as desired by applicant, it passed an
ex-parte order rejecting the application.
c)
SEBI’s argument that the consent application
was not maintainable because it fell within a restricted category was also not
accepted by SAT, since this ought to have been known to SEBI from inception.
Even more so since SEBI still had discretion to consider, on facts, cases
falling in such categories.
SEBI’s argument that the consent application
was not maintainable because it fell within a restricted category was also not
accepted by SAT, since this ought to have been known to SEBI from inception.
Even more so since SEBI still had discretion to consider, on facts, cases
falling in such categories.
Despite these observations, SAT effectively said that its hands were
tied down by the amendments which had retrospective effect and barred appeal
against any order.
tied down by the amendments which had retrospective effect and barred appeal
against any order.
It appears almost certain, particularly considering the stakes involved
(the allegation is that illegal gains of Rs. 513.12 crores were made), that the
Order of SAT would be appealed against before the Supreme Court. Many more
grounds may also be raised before the Supreme Court including the vires of the
amendments, whether they give unbridled powers to SEBI, whether SEBI need not
observe rules of natural justice while considering such applications, etc. The
adverse observations of SAT most certainly would come to aid of the applicant.
(the allegation is that illegal gains of Rs. 513.12 crores were made), that the
Order of SAT would be appealed against before the Supreme Court. Many more
grounds may also be raised before the Supreme Court including the vires of the
amendments, whether they give unbridled powers to SEBI, whether SEBI need not
observe rules of natural justice while considering such applications, etc. The
adverse observations of SAT most certainly would come to aid of the applicant.
Hopefully, assuming the appeal is made, the Supreme Court will also
resolve other issues relating to mechanism of consent orders and those arising
out of the retrospective amendments. The Court may decide once and for all
whether SEBI has powers, under the earlier law and the amended law, of passing
Consent Orders. This ruling may also thus clear the air on whether Consent
Orders passed till now are valid in law. It may be particularly recollected
that the earlier law did not have specific and clear provisions empowering SEBI
to pass consent orders. The amended law, though it did give such powers, had
raised fresh concerns as discussed in earlier posts.
resolve other issues relating to mechanism of consent orders and those arising
out of the retrospective amendments. The Court may decide once and for all
whether SEBI has powers, under the earlier law and the amended law, of passing
Consent Orders. This ruling may also thus clear the air on whether Consent
Orders passed till now are valid in law. It may be particularly recollected
that the earlier law did not have specific and clear provisions empowering SEBI
to pass consent orders. The amended law, though it did give such powers, had
raised fresh concerns as discussed in earlier posts.
Apart from such basic issues, it is submitted that even otherwise the ruling
of SAT that the orders relating to consent application are wholly non-appealable
is questionable. The law provides for several pre-conditions and procedures
subject to which the consent order may be passed. Further, principles of
natural justice would in any case have to be followed. Such order would also
have to be in accordance with Regulations made. The Order of SEBI would, it is
respectfully submitted, thus be questionable on several grounds. It is
submitted that SAT’s blanket denial of such grounds of questioning in appeal of
such orders is not correct.
of SAT that the orders relating to consent application are wholly non-appealable
is questionable. The law provides for several pre-conditions and procedures
subject to which the consent order may be passed. Further, principles of
natural justice would in any case have to be followed. Such order would also
have to be in accordance with Regulations made. The Order of SEBI would, it is
respectfully submitted, thus be questionable on several grounds. It is
submitted that SAT’s blanket denial of such grounds of questioning in appeal of
such orders is not correct.
Thus, it would be interesting to watch the progress of this case. The
journey would surely be long. Assuming the order of SAT is appealed against,
the matter could be restored back to SEBI for fresh consideration of the
application for consent. The outcome of such proceedings themselves could be
matter of appeal.
journey would surely be long. Assuming the order of SAT is appealed against,
the matter could be restored back to SEBI for fresh consideration of the
application for consent. The outcome of such proceedings themselves could be
matter of appeal.
Even if the appeal is rejected (or not made), the matter would go back
to SEBI for considering the allegations on merits, which could go into a fresh
round of appeals.
to SEBI for considering the allegations on merits, which could go into a fresh
round of appeals.
An observation in passing is worth making. Consent Orders can be
compared with arbitration. Like arbitration, Consent Orders too are meant for
speeding up and even substituting litigation. As in arbitration, appeals are
barred in Consent Orders too. However, if even consent orders end up in
prolonged litigation instead of speeding it up, then the purpose may not be
served. And thus, the classic and oft-quoted words of lament of the Supreme
Court (in Guru Nanak Foundation vs Rattan Singh & Sons) could
apply to consent orders too:-
compared with arbitration. Like arbitration, Consent Orders too are meant for
speeding up and even substituting litigation. As in arbitration, appeals are
barred in Consent Orders too. However, if even consent orders end up in
prolonged litigation instead of speeding it up, then the purpose may not be
served. And thus, the classic and oft-quoted words of lament of the Supreme
Court (in Guru Nanak Foundation vs Rattan Singh & Sons) could
apply to consent orders too:-
“Interminable, time consuming, complex and expensive court procedures impelled jurists to search for an alternative forum, less formal, more effective and speedy for resolution of disputes avoiding procedure claptrap and this lead them to Arbitration Act 1940. The way in which the proceedings under the Act
are conducted and without exception challenged in courts has made lawyers laugh
and legal philosophers weep. Experience shows and law reports bear testimony
that the proceedings under the Act have become highly technical, accompanied by
unending prolixity at every stage, providing a legal trap to the unwary. An
informal forum chosen by the parties for expeditious disposal of their disputes
has by the decisions of the courts been clothed with legalese of unforeseen
complexity.”