The Proviso, Public Interest and Section 391
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4 responses to “The Proviso, Public Interest and Section 391”
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"….It is submitted that the decision, which contains a valuable account of the law on these points, is correct."THE JUDGMENT COMMENTED ON MAKES FOR A TRULY INTERESTING READING. IT DESERVES TO BE HEARTILY COMMENDED AS ONE OF THE VERY FEW OF ITS KIND LATELY REPORTED, THAT IS MARKED BY THE JUDICIAL WISDOM.THE PRACTICAL SIGNIFICANCE OR OTHERWISE OF THE CONCEPT OF 'MAJORITY', AND WHAT WEIGHTAGE COULD BE GIVEN THERETO IN ANY SUCH MATTER IN WHICH THE OVERRIDING CONSIDERATION MUST BE THE LARGER 'PUBLIC INTEREST' HAVE BEEN LUCIDLY DEALT WITH. THE COURT, IF CLOSELY LOOKED AT, SEEMS TO HAVE CHOSEN TO APPLY PRICIPLES OF NATURAL JUSTICE, AND GO BY THE 'SPIRIT' OF THE LAW, NOT BEING NECESSARILY BOGGED DOWN BY SIMPLY ITS 'LETTER. (to be continued)
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@vswamiOn the concept of ‘majority’, invariably misconstrued and followed blindly,also in our changed times, the words of deep wisdom, serving as a caution, uttered by a great thinker, late NA Palkhivala are noteworthy: Anyone, if endowed with ability to think clearly, “will adopt an attitude of reserve towards ideologies that are popular and be critical of nostrums that are fashionable. It is true that in a democracy the majority view should prevail. But never make the mistake of thinking that the validity of a proposition or the correctness of a doctrine depends on the number of people who believe in it….. In the fields of.. economics, the soundness of an ideology is often in inverse proportion to the popular support it commands.”“The voice of a small minority is today mistaken to be the voice of the majority, simply because it is loud and vociferous, while the still, small voice of reason is not heard.”(Quotes from a couple of his memorable speeches; though delivered in different contexts, may be found to ring the bell / aptly fit in into any form or principle of ‘democracy’/ its derivatives, not necessarily in relation to a nation.)
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Just a couple of doubts rather than comments:In para 94 of the judgement, the court holds that "consequently, this objection cannot be sustained, in the absence of any of the shareholders raising it as a ground for going back on the consent given earlier"1)does the court accept this as a valid ground for withdraw of consent,in cases shareholder raises such an objection?2) if yes, what is the scope of the listing agreement applying to an amalgamation? Is a company bound to adhere to its provisions for the sanction of a scheme? Where do you derive such a position from?3)How does one justify this as a valid ground for withdrawal of consents with reference to sections.391-394 as they have been held to to be complete code in itself?Thanks
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Thanks Ajar. Re (1), I think this objection has more to do with the merits of the scheme than consent. In fact, given the view the Court took on the role of consent, it is of limited significance because the court in any case independently examines the scheme. Re (2), whether a company is bound to adhere to such provisions or not, the fact that it has not done so may have a bearing on the court's analysis of the merits of the merger under section 391(2).Re (3), the fact that section 391-4 is a complete code means only that certain restrictions found in other provisions of the Act may not apply to a scheme(for example reduction of capital, but even there see Bachawat J.'s classic analysis of what "complete code" really means in AIR 1960 Cal 637).
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